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1 Introduction 
The Brundtland commission report of 1987 (World Commission on Environment and 
Development - WCED, 1987) brought the concept of sustainable development into politics. In 
the follow-up of the Brundtland report Agenda 21 introduced the concept of sustainable 
development indicators. The text in Agenda 21 reads as follows “Countries at the national 
level and international governmental and non-governmental organizations at the 
international level should develop the concept of indicators of sustainable development in 
order to identify such indicators”. 
Today most developed countries have their own set of indicators for sustainable development. 
A subset of these is climate change indicators. Some of these indicators focus on the state of 
the global climate, for instance, an indicator showing the global concentration of GHGs in the 
atmosphere or the global mean temperature. Others focus on national GHG emissions or 
national energy usage, for example, national emissions as compared to the Kyoto obligations, 
indicators for the energy intensity of the economy, and indicators tracking energy usage as a 
share of GDP (see appendix 1 for an overview).  
Global warming represents man's biggest environmental challenge. In spite of the fact that the 
current concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere is approaching critical 
levels, global emissions are steadily increasing. Many argue that continued world economic 
growth is incompatible with the proposed stabilization targets for GHG concentration in the 
atmosphere. This would imply that we are on an unsustainable path. 
According to Alfsen and Sæbø (1993) a sustainable development indicator should provide 
condensed and neutral information about the state and development of an environmental or 
economic asset to the general public. In our opinion the indicator should additionally make it 
possible for the general public (the electorate) to evaluate current national policies (their 
politicians).  As long as the indicator concerns states of the environment/natural resources 
over which the national government has some level of influence or control, there is a clear 
(sometimes even causal) link between government policy and bad performance on the 
indicator. However, none of the existing indicators for climate change fulfil this criterion.  
Firstly, a physical climate change indicator showing a bad or disturbing global trajectory of 
GHG concentrations does not tell much about the current climate policy of a nation state. 
Most countries’ emissions seen separately are simply too small to make any significant 
difference to global physical climate. Further, the indicators that focus on national emissions 
or other related physical accounts like energy usage fare little better, since they do not have 
any benchmark. For instance, projections of the global temperature based on current 
developments indicate that we will see higher levels than the commonly agreed target of 
maximum 2 degrees Celsius by the end of the century. Nevertheless, an indicator measuring 
EU’s compliance with the Kyoto treaty would turn out positive, since the Kyoto treaty is 
insufficient in several regards. The existing indicators are backward-looking, with no 
foresight-component that addresses the future requirements of each nation state to impending 
global warming. 
The rationale for having sustainable development indicators is to provide information in an 
engaging, easy communicable form that potentially can be used by the informed citizens to 
evaluate the current policies of the nation state. Thus, indicators for national climate policy 
should do more than simply report the state of the global climate or the absolute level of CO2 
emissions from a nation state.  
In this paper we work out a proposal that the climate policy indicator can be based on Kant’s 
categorical imperative (to be presented below). This imperative implies that the climate policy 
of a nation state should be judged by the extent it contributes to the global solution of the 
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climate change problem. Obviously this can be interpreted in a number of ways. We 
understand this to mean an ethical norm that each nation state should act as if a sufficient 
global treaty on climate change were in place.  
There are a series of choices that must be made when constructing a forward-looking climate 
policy indicator. The first, and most basic, concerns the ethical foundation for the indicator. In 
most discussions on climate policy, the framework of cost-efficiency is used, which frames 
the discourse in economic utilitarianism: The climate policy should be chosen that contributes 
to the maximisation of utility and thus social welfare of its citizens. It is a consequentialist 
ethics, which restricts the scope to include the nation state’s citizens and excludes concern 
with other nation states’ citizens or global ecosystems.  
An alternative approach to the state-centred utilitarianism is a Kantian ethics, which is based 
on duty rather than consequences. The first choice or question therefore becomes:  
1) Should the climate policy indicator be based on state-centred utilitarianism or 
Kantian ethics? 
If utilitarianism is chosen, one can then construct a climate policy indicator based on cost-
efficient fulfilment of international obligations and on the capital approach (more below).  
If Kantian ethics is chosen, the second choice becomes:  
2) What kind of benchmark should a sufficient global treaty on climate change have? 
We propose that it should it be based on the 20 C degree target. This target makes it possible 
to calculate the remaining global GHG-emission budget. The third choice is then:  
3) How should the remaining global GHG-emission budget be allocated between 
nation states? 
We propose that it should be based on the egalitarian principle of allocation because it is 
simple and because it is coherent with Kant’s moral philosophy. Having chosen an allocation 
principle, each nation can be given its share of the remaining global GHG-emission budget.  
The fourth and last question is: 
4) To what extent should trade with CO2 emission rights be “allowed” when keeping 
within the budget? 
For reasons outlined below we are skeptical to unlimited emission trade. Instead we propose 
to use the rule each nation state should act as if a sufficient global treaty on climate change 
were in place as the guiding principle. This implies that nation states should act as if the 
international emission permit price were much higher than today. Based on review of studies 
by integrated assessment models we suggest that the price should be at least $40. Figure 1 
illustrates the stages described above: 
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Figure 1 “Choosing a sustainable development indicator for the global climate”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure also gives an outline of the structure of the paper: First we discuss the existing 
literature on sustainable development indicators. Next, the ethical basis (utilitarian or 
Kantian) of a climate policy indicator (CPI) is outlined. In Section 4 the question of the 
design of the sufficient global treaty and allocation between states is discussed. This leads to 
Section 5 where our proposed indicator, KCPI, is outlined with an example application of the 
indicator for the nation state of Norway. Section 5 also includes a discussion of emission 
trading. 
In Section 6 we discuss some additional topics such as for instance how to treat emissions that 
happens outside the jurisdiction in question. One prominent example is Norwegian oil export, 
and the question of whether this export should be limited by climate concerns. We also 
include a brief discussion of implications for R&D policy. Finally, in the concluding section 7 
we discuss and evaluate whether the KCPI meets important criteria for evaluation of 
indicators such as measurability, relevance and the precautionary principle. 
2 The existing literature on sustainable development 
indicators 
We have identified two main strands of literature. The first strand is coined the Driving forces 
- Pressures -States - Impacts - Responses (DPSIR), while the other strand is called the capital 
approach. We briefly go through both below. 
2.1  DPSIR approach 
This approach seeks to identify already existing statistics within some specified field and 
assign them to certain categories (driving forces, pressures, states, impacts, and responses). 
The framework was developed by the European Environmental Agency in the 1990‘s based 
on a pressure-state-response (PSR) model developed by OECD (EEA 1998, OECD 1991 and 
1993). Each field should ideally include indicators from all categories. Applied to the climate 
change field, we could for instance end up with the following set of indicators that nearly all 
are in use by nation states today (see appendix 1): 
State centered
utilitarianism
Kantian ethics
Cost-effective
fulfillment of 
international 
obligations 
and
Capital 
approach 
to safeguard
national wealth 
Egalitarian 
allocation
National 
Paths
Benchmark: Global 
remaining GHG budget
Kantian Climate Policy Indicator (KCPI) 
Limited emission trading
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• Driving forces indicators: Population growth, economic growth 
• Pressure indicators: Total GHG emissions of a country, carbon footprint of final 
consumption etc. 
• State indicators: National and/or global annual mean temperature, GHG emissions as 
compared to the Kyoto treaty target etc. 
• Impacts indicators: Weather related accidents, economic losses from such events, etc. 
• Response indicators: Income from CO2 taxes, expenditure for GHG emission 
reduction activities etc. 
 
One problem with the DPSIR approach is that it does not provide any guidance beyond the 
classification of indicators. Since there are very many possible measures of climate policy 
that fits into one of the categories, the selection of the final indicators is vulnerable to special 
interests and political pressures to present a glossy picture. Another problem is the lack of 
benchmark. This also applies to comparing a nation state’s performance with the Kyoto treaty 
target. Most agree that Kyoto is insufficient, but is it then sufficient to comply with the Kyoto 
target?  
2.2 The Capital Approach  
The capital approach seeks to narrow down the number of possible indicators to the main 
forms of capital. The underlying idea is that welfare is ‘produced’ by use of various types of 
capital: real or produced capital, human capital, natural (including environmental) capital and, 
sometimes, social capital (UNECE 2009, Stiglitz et al. 2009, Alfsen and Moe 2008, Arrow et 
al. 2010). Sustainable development indicators should ideally concern status of the various 
stocks of capital, i.e. states of the environment, natural resources, human capital etc., and not 
flows like GHG emissions per year, energy usage per unit of GDP, educational attainment per 
year etc. Secondly, one should ideally measure all types of capital as the money value of the 
stock and not the physical value of the stock e.g. number of Atlantic cod, square kilometer of 
untouched nature etc. This is because it is hard to say if a situation with some increasing, and 
some decreasing physical stocks is good or bad if measured in different and incompatible 
units.  
In the practical application of the approach stocks are divided into stocks that can be given a 
monetary value based on market prices, and stocks for which market prices are not 
observable. For the latter, calculation of market prices is currently controversial or 
impossible; see Alfsen and Greaker (2007). While the former types of stocks can be lumped 
together and given an economic value, the latter types of stocks require that we keep separate 
physical accounts for each of the stocks. The stocks are measured in some physical unit, and 
the aim of policy is to ensure against depleting the stock below some minimum level.  
When stocks are given a monetary value, sustainability does not necessarily imply keeping 
the capital value of each stock intact. Exchanging natural capital with human made capital in 
order to increase total stocks is referred to as weak sustainability; see Harris (2002). It 
requires that natural and human made capital is substitutable. On the contrary, taking the 
strong sustainability approach, we would keep separate accounts for natural capital even if 
they could be given an economic value, and ensure against depleting any of these stocks 
below some predetermined minimum level.  
Most of the applied literature on the capital approach has chosen to focus on the genuine 
savings indicator (World Bank, 2006), also called comprehensive investments by Arrow et al. 
(2010). The genuine savings indicator aims to measure all changes in the capital stocks. In 
addition to investments in man maid capital, all types of investments connected to 
CICERO Working Paper  2012:02 
  A Kantian approach to a sustainable development indicator for climate 
 
 
 
 
5 
environmental degradation and depletion of non-renewable natural resources are also 
included. The investment flows are given a monetary value, and summed for each year. The 
genuine investment indicator can be seen as a direct application of the weak sustainability 
concept: If the genuine investment indicator is positive, the economy is sustainable.  
More recent applications of the genuine investment indicator have also included CO2 
emissions as damage, or negative investment. In the book "Where is the wealth of nations?" 
(World Bank, 2006), Hamilton et al. calculate the genuine savings indicator in the following 
way: 
Genuine savings = 
I. + Net investments in physical capital 
II. + Expenses for education e.g. wages paid to teachers, but excluding investment in 
buildings etc. (investments in human capital) 
III. - Rents in the non-renewable natural resource sectors  
IV. - Damages to the environment from particulate matter 
V. - Damages to the environment from emissions of carbon dioxide  
 
With respect to V), Hamilton et al. used the CO2 emissions of the country in question 
multiplied with a price of CO2 emission as a proxy for the damages to the country.  
This way of calculating the damages from CO2 emissions does not take into account that 
climate change is a global environmental problem, that is, countries are hurt not only by their 
own emissions, but also by global emissions. In contrast, Arrow et al. (2010) uses global 
emissions, and calculates the total global damages from these emissions (now and in the 
future). Finally, a share of the total damages is attributed to the country in question based on 
its “climate change vulnerability”.  
The national policy response to increasing climate disinvestments in the genuine savings 
indicator could be to increase investments in other areas such as human capital.   
More importantly, decreasing national GHG emissions will for most countries not improve 
genuine savings since most countries’ emissions seen separately are too small to make any 
significant difference to global emissions.  Hence, the genuine savings indicator, even if it 
includes climate costs, cannot be used to judge national climate policy.   
3 Ethical bases for a national Climate Policy Indicator (CPI) 
3.1 A state centred utilitarian approach  
Many would argue that the best response to an international climate treaty for a nation state 
would be to simply comply with the treaty in the least expensive way possible. If the treaty 
includes trade in emission permits, this can be achieved, assuming efficient markets, by 
introducing a uniform tax on GHG emissions faced by all emitters equal to the international 
price on emissions permits. Compliance is then assured at minimum cost by buying or selling 
emission permits on the international market for such permits. This approach constitutes what 
we call a state centred utilitarian approach to climate change. According to this approach, the 
question of a separate indicator for climate policy is trivial: The indicator should just be 
measuring compliance with the international treaty. Moreover, damages from climate change 
should be taken care of by investing in other types of capital as prescribed by the capital 
approach above. In Figure 1 the left-side pathway for constructing a climate policy indicator 
illustrates this.  
But what if it is generally acknowledged that the international climate treaty is insufficient? 
That is, a majority of countries would like deeper emission cuts today, but all the same, they 
do not succeed in building this into the treaty. This situation invites a deeper ethical 
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reflection: What is the right thing to do, when we have an insufficient global treaty? One 
could argue that it is no point in going beyond the treaty anyhow as the benefits to the 
country’s citizens would be outweighed by the increased national GHG abatement costs.  One 
the other hand, each nation state then restricts its ethical considerations only to its own 
citizens and only relates to its citizens as consumers, while not taking other persons and the 
global situation into account. Moreover, if all states act in this way, one could argue that it 
may be more difficult to improve the international treaty since no state is willing to provide a 
“good example”. Finally, and most importantly, this ethical view may not fit with the 
reasoning of the citizens in the country in question. 
Today, we have an insufficient climate treaty in several senses. The Kyoto protocol is 
insufficient both since it fails to specify targets for the years after 2012, and since it limits 
emissions only from a minority of countries. There seems to be a demand from many worried 
and informed citizens that a nation state should do more than just complying with an 
imperfect treaty in the least expensive way possible. This could be due to these citizens 
already reasoning along the lines of another type of ethics than “state centred utilitarianism”.  
3.2 The Kantian approach to climate change 
In Kant’s moral theory, it is through the concept of duty one determines which actions are 
prescribed (or forbidden), regardless of the consequences of the action (or inaction). These 
duties are rooted in the categorical imperative, a rule that is used to judge maxims, or plans of 
actions. Kant formulated three versions of the categorical imperative, which describes the 
same basic “moral law” from separate perspectives. These versions can be dubbed 1) 
Universal law, 2) Dignity of persons and 3) Kingdom of Ends. The first, “Universal Law” is 
the most commonly known version of the categorical imperative: “act only according to that 
maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant, 
1785, p. 421). This form is based on consistency; for instance, if everyone adopted a maxim 
of lying, no one would believe anything that anyone said, and lying would lose its 
effectiveness.  
Kant further makes a critical distinction between two major types of duties; perfect and 
imperfect duties. One understanding of this distinction is that perfect duties are duties of 
action, while imperfect duties are duties of ends: “the distinction which Kant has in mind is 
that between a law commanding (or prohibiting) an action and a law prescribing the pursuit of 
an end” (Gregor, 1963, p. 98). Perfect duties require precise actions, or abstinence from 
actions: do not lie, do not kill, etc. Perfect duties, insofar as they are negative duties (as most 
are), constrain the agent from using certain actions to achieve their ends based on inclination. 
Imperfect duties, being less precise, state ends, such as beneficence, that should be adopted, 
because the ends are in accordance with the categorical imperative (understood as the 
Universal law, Dignity of Persons, and the Kingdom of Ends). Kant leaves the rational agent 
some discretion regarding how heavily to weigh these dutiful ends against one’s self-
interested ends. He suggests that they should be pursued when it would not lead to excessive 
hardship or sacrifice on the part of the agent: “How far should one expend one’s resources in 
practicing beneficence? Surely not to the extent that he himself would finally come to need 
the beneficence of others” (Kant, 1797, p. 454). 
The question regarding this distinction in our context becomes: Is reducing the emissions of 
greenhouse gases a “perfect” or an “imperfect” duty according to Kantian ethics? A case can 
be made that since climate change may imperil human lives – now and in the future, avoiding 
climate emissions is a perfect duty in a Kantian sense, similar to “do not kill”. However, 
another argument can be made that “do not lie” and “do not kill” are duties with an a priori 
and immediate self-evident connection to reason and the dignity of persons. But “do not emit 
GHGs” may be said to be more indirect since it bases itself not on immediate recognition of 
logical inconsistency with the categorical imperative, but on theoretical and empirical, ie. a 
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posteriori, assumptions about connections between GHG emissions and the long term 
destructive potential of climate change. We believe that the latter argument is stronger, and 
hence “do not emit GHGs” becomes an imperfect duty – a duty of ends to be balanced 
according to the situation.  
In the case of climate change, we interpret Kantian ethics that each person should act 
according to a “universal law”. Further, if we can apply the same Kantian ethics at a national 
level, then each nation state should act according to a sufficient global treaty. However, 
since the imperative “do not emit GHG” is an imperfect duty, there is no such thing as one 
“ideal” and sufficient global treaty on climate change. Rather, the sufficient global treaty has 
to be defined by the nation state itself before it can start to act as if this treaty were in place.  
In our opinion, the nation state is however not fully free to design its own version of a 
sufficient treaty. Rather it should strive to comply with both the categorical imperative in a 
priori sense and with the existing international treaties or commitments in a posteriori sense. 
Thus, if the nation in question has agreed to the United Nations Framework Convention of 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), the provisions in the UNFCCC should be taken into account 
when defining what we above have coined a sufficient global treaty. If not the nation could be 
said to break another duty e.g. nations should aim to comply with international treaties it has 
ratified (ie. “do not lie” and “do not break agreed treaties”).  
For a nation state to be able to act as if a global sufficient treaty is in place, then this global 
treaty must be made explicit. The work of UNFCCC provides a common starting point. The 
main objective of the UNFCCC is to stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level which prevents dangerous anthropogenic interferences with the climate system (Article 
2). Thus a global treaty on climate change must put some kind of restriction on the GHG 
emissions of the countries involved. Moreover, in the Copenhagen accord most nations 
agreed to set the level of “dangerous anthropogenic interferences with the climate system” to 
a maximum of 2 degrees global temperature increase. This restriction can be formulated as a 
given global remaining GHG budget.  
Since the proposed indicator (KCPI) is based on an explicit description of the envisioned 
treaty, each nation must go further than the UNFCCC and the Copenhagen Accord in 
describing what their version of a sufficient treaty would look like. Only then can the nation 
state act as if such a global treaty were in place, and only then can the indicator measure to 
what extent this is the case.  
4 The GHG budget and allocation between nations 
4.1 The remaining global GHG budget 
In order to calculate the remaining GHG budget one must specify: a) a maximum allowable 
global temperature increase (target), b) a sufficient probability of not exceeding the target, c) 
a time frame for counting and adding emissions. The EU has agreed on maximum 2 degrees C 
as their temperature target. Now this target has been ‘taken note of’ by the signatories to the 
Copenhagen accord (2009), and has thus received a near global, if informal, acceptance.  
The relationship between the temperature increase and the concentration of GHG gasses in 
the atmosphere is not known with certainty. One therefore also has to decide by which 
probability the target should not be exceeded. For instance, it makes a huge difference 
whether one allows for a 50% or a 25% likelihood of exceeding the target. There is no global 
consensus on this matter, and research is likely to continuously produce new knowledge about 
the relationship between concentrations and likely global temperature increases.  
Setting a time scale is also necessary to make the notion of a remaining GHG budget 
practical. Meinshausen et al. (2009) suggest looking at the time period from year 2000 to 
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2050. According to Meinshausen et al., the remaining GHG budget for the period 2000 to 
2050 is 2000 GtCO2-e if we settle for a 50% probability of exceeding 2 degrees C and 1500 
GtCO2-e if we settle for a 25% probability of exceeding 2 degrees C. 
4.2 Allocation of the remaining GHG budget 
The next major question is how to interpret the Kantian approach in regards to the allocation 
between nation states. There exists a large literature on allocation principles. The following 
table (Table 1) based on a similar table in Vaillancourt and Waaub (2004) lists some ethical 
criteria. 
Table 1 “Equity principles to allocate remaining global CO2 budget” 
Principle Significations Applications 
Sovereignty 
(grandfathering) 
Past emitters should be held harmless 
and their current emissions constitute a 
right established by past usage 
Equal percentage cuts from a 
historical level 
Egalitarianism 
/human rights 
Each human being alive has equal 
rights to common global resources 
Proportional allocation of budget 
based on population 
Ability to pay The rich should pay for the abatement Proportional reduction to GDP i.e. 
high GDP -> small share of the 
GHG budget 
Comparable costs Countries should be affected similarly 
i.e. burdens should be comparable 
Equal GHG abatement costs as a 
proportion of GDP 
Historical 
responsibility 
Past emitters should pay according to 
their historical emissions 
High historical emissions  higher 
cost share as proportion of GDP 
 
Countries do not agree on one principle. Moreover each principle yields a different allocation 
of the remaining GHG budget. For instance, we can illustrate this by comparing the principle 
of “sovereignty” with the principle of “egalitarianism”. We invoke year 2000 as the year of 
allocating the budget, and focus on the “50% exceeding 2 degrees Celsius probability” 
budget.  
If the world is going to stay within its remaining GHG budget, it cannot on average emit more 
than 39,2 GtCO2-e per year in period from year 2000 to year 2050. Since world emission was 
41,8 GtCO2-e in the year 2000, it is necessary to reduce emissions by 6,1% in that year and 
keep emissions below the level. The principle of sovereignty would thus require all nations to 
reduce their emissions by 6,1% in year 2000 and keep those emissions.  
Of the principles above, egalitarianism is probably the closest to Kantian ethics, with its 
emphasis on Dignity of Persons. The principle of egalitarianism implies that each person 
living at the time of the allocation receives an equal share of the remaining GHG budget. In 
the year 2000, the estimated world population was 6.1 billion. 1 Hence, each person living in 
the year 2000 is allocated 6.4 tons of GHG emissions on average per year in the period from 
2000 to 2050. Table 2 presents a short glimpse of the implications for selected nations of the 
two principles: 
                                                     
1 US Census Bureau gives 6.090 bill., see http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpop.php 
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Table 2 “GHG emission per year per capita year 2000”, Tons CO2-eq. per capita 
Country  Year 2000 2 Reduction based 
on “sovereignty” 
Reduction based on 
“egalitarianism” 
United States 22.9 1.4 16.5 
South Africa  9.5 0.6 3.1 
Bolivia  8.1 0.5 1.7 
Sweden  7.5 0.4 1.1 
Norway 11.9 0.7 5.5 
China  3.9 0.2 -2.5 
India  1.8 0.1 -4.6 
 
 As one can see from Table 2 the principle of sovereignty would demand that also developing 
countries like India should reduce their emissions by 0.1 tCO2-e per person (5.5%) from year 
2000 levels, and keep this low level forever. Thus, countries with low emissions would never 
be able to increase their emissions. This seems to be in conflict with the UNFCCC Article 3.1 
which states that the developed countries should take the lead in combating climate change, 
and with Article 3.2 which states that the specific needs and special circumstances of 
developing country parties should be given full consideration. The principle of sovereignty 
also seems to be in conflict with the equality inherent in the “Dignity of Persons”.  
The principle of “egalitarianism” allows growth in emissions both in India and China; see the 
negative number in column four in Table 2. On the other hand, even the principle of 
egalitarianism implies that poorer countries like Bolivia would have to reduce their emissions, 
and very rich countries like Sweden are close to the target already. Such anomalies are the 
reason why principles based on abatement costs and current incomes (such as ‘ability to pay’) 
are being brought into the debate. Clearly, such principles are much more complicated to 
apply, as they require information about country specific abatement costs, and a rule for how 
to take account of current wealth.  
Both for practical (complication) and for ethical reasons (Dignity of Persons), we therefore 
propose the principle of “egalitarianism” for the allocation rule for our proposed Kantian 
climate policy indicator.  
5 The Kantian Climate Policy Indicator applied  
If one follows the path of choices outlined above, a climate policy indicator that builds on 
Kantian ethics, a fixed remaining GHG budget and egalitarian principles, can be constructed. 
With a given current emission level and a given population, a national path of GHG emissions 
for the nation state can be calculated.  
We use Norway as an example, and invoke year 2000 as the year of allocating the budget. We 
also focus on the “50% exceeding 2 degrees probability”. In year 2000 the world population 
                                                     
2 Source: World Resources Institute: www.wri.gov 
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was 6.115 billion, while the population of Norway was 4.5 million. By simple equality 
Norway’s remaining GHG budget is then 1.5 GtCO2-e.  
In Figure 2 below we compare different emission paths. Firstly, we have drawn a yardstick 
path, which is only the remaining GHG budget of Norway divided equally among the years 
from year 2000 to year 2050. Secondly, we have drawn three paths which show Norway’s 
predicted business as usual emissions (BaU path), Norway’s targeted emissions from 
Norwegian jurisdiction (Target path) and finally, Norway’s targeted emissions including 
planned emission permit acquisitions (Target with trading).  
 
Figure 2 “Emission paths for Norway”  
 
 
In the period from year 2000 until 2008 Norway has already emitted 465 million ton CO2 
equivalents. These emissions form the first eight years of the BaU, Target and Target with 
trading paths. The predictions for Norway’s BaU emissions do not go longer than year 2030. 
Further, Norway has yet set no target for emissions from Norwegian territory beyond 2020. 
What can we say about Norway’s performance? The indicator has two parts: A yardstick path, 
and the actual emissions including emission permit acquisitions/sales. Thus, in the first 8 
years for which we have figures, Norway is not doing well. On the other, the plans look 
better, but of course, it remains to be seen whether plans will be followed up. Moreover, there 
are a number of further complicating issues to be discussed. First among them is the issue of 
trade in CO2 emission rights, which is included in one of the projected emissions paths in 
Figure 2.  
6  Include trade with emission rights? 
In a global treaty in which all countries had accepted the allocation of the remaining GHG 
budget, emission trading would likely be desirable. This would likely mutually benefit both 
developed and developing countries. Emission trading as a principle is established in the 
UNFCCC Article 3.1., and the rules are specified in the Kyoto treaty. Hence, it is possible for 
countries to engage in internationally agreed emission trading already today. So why 
shouldn’t emission trading be taken into account when measuring to what extent a country 
was running a deficit on its remaining GHG budget?  
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With trade in emission rights a market price for emission rights will emerge. Since emissions 
no longer are costless for the country, the economy will adjust accordingly. Note that, the 
initial allocation of the remaining GHG budget and the equilibrium price on GHG emissions 
is independent of each other, that is, assuming free global trade all allocations are likely to 
result in the same equilibrium price. This is because the size of the remaining GHG budget is 
the same. However, the prices we observe today are likely not the prices we would observe if 
a sufficient global climate treaty were in place. It could therefore be argued that extensive 
emission trading in order to fulfil the KPCI is not consistent with acting as if a sufficient 
global treaty were in place. 
In order to act as if a sufficient global treaty were in place, the government needs to have an 
opinion of what the equilibrium global price on GHG emissions would be in the hypothetical 
situation. There exists a strand of studies based on global economic models designed to 
predict the GHG price that would emerge given some GHG concentration target. Table 3 
presents a synthesis of these studies. With respect to the 2 degree C target, a concentration of 
450 ppm CO2 equivalents or 400 ppm CO2 is sometimes argued as a sufficiently low 
concentration of GHG gasses.3 From the studies in table 3 we see that this requires a GHG 
price of the order of $200 per tonnes CO2-equivalent in year 2050. (See Hoel et al. 2009 for a 
more in depth survey).  
 
Table 3 Predictions of the GHG emissions equilibrium price 
Study Criteria Initial Price on 
GHG emissions 
Price on GHG 
emissions year 
2050 
Price GHG 
emissions year 
2100 
IPCC, 2007 535-590 ppm 
CO2-eq.  
US$ 20-80 (year 
2030) 
US$ 30-150  
IEA, World 
Energy Outlook, 
2008 
450 ppm, CO2-
eq. 
 US$ 180 
(year 2030) 
 
Stern Report 500-550 ppm, 
CO2-eq. 
US$ 40 
(year 2005) 
US$ 98 
(2% growth) 
 
Nordhaus, Dice 420 ppm, only 
CO2 
US$ 40 
(year 2010) 
US$ 189 
(year 2055) 
US$ 208 
(year 2105) 
 
Clearly, there are large uncertainties with respect to the hypothetical permit price. Depending 
on technological development, the efficiency of the GHG emission permit markets etc., the 
models may either under or over estimate the GHG price. As long as the models are our best 
guess, it is however, hard to see any reason for departing from the “best guess”.  
If we assume an international market for emission right with banking and borrowing, the price 
on emission rights would likely increase the risk adjusted real interest rate. For instance, if the 
                                                     
3 IPCC estimates 450 ppm CO2e to give 2,2 degrees C as best guess. 
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GHG price increases by 4 per cent each year, the price today must be $42 in order for the 
price to be $200 in the year 2050. According to the studies above, a price of $200 in 2050 is 
likely to limit emission such that the world stays within its remaining GHG budget.  
Thus, we propose the following rule with respect to emission trading: 
1. Carry out all national GHG abatement projects that has a price in $ per ton GHG 
gasses abated below or equal to the hypothetical permit price 
2. In case the KPCI is not fulfilled, buy emission permits in order to stay within the 
budget 
In order to ensure that I) is fulfilled the main KCPI, including acquired emission permits, 
should be accompanied with a graph depicting the discrepancy between the national price of 
GHG emissions in the different sectors of the economy and a price path based on the assumed 
global price to 2050. If the KCPI-price is too low according to this assumed price path, then 
the climate policy is too weak, independently of whether the nation is staying within their 
given GHG budget. 
Should CDM or other kinds of project based emission trading with developing countries be 
included in II) above? As long as countries participating in emission trading do not have a 
binding emission ceiling, it is very hard to know to what extent emission reduction projects 
lead to real emission reductions (see e.g. Rosendahl and Strand, 2009). First, it should be 
possible to include this kind of uncertainty when emission off-sets are counted. Second, we 
interpret Kant’s formulation of the universal law as saying that countries should act as if a 
sufficient global treaty were in place. In the global treaty low cost GHG abatement options in 
developing countries would be carried out albeit to higher price on what we observe on CDM 
today which is taken care of by I) above. 
7 Other considerations 
7.1 Emissions caused abroad 
We focus on emissions from jurisdictions not distinguishing between emissions coming from 
the production or from the consumption of goods as long as the emission take place within the 
country in question. Some argue that emissions from production of export goods should not 
be counted, and that emissions in other countries caused by imports should be counted. In our 
opinion this way of counting emissions is not consistent with the concept of a sufficient 
global treaty. When the treaty allocates the remaining GHG budget to countries, the 
responsibility for emission reductions must rest on the country itself. It is hard for countries to 
regulate emissions in other countries in an efficient way, and hence, it is hardly desirable to 
give countries responsibility for emissions originating in other countries.  
As long as other countries have GHG taxes below the globally optimal, import of GHG 
intensive goods will likely be too cheap and hence excessive. In theory this could be 
accounted for some appropriately set border tax. However, one should not underestimate the 
complexity in calculating such border taxes. Moreover, as long as the method is hard to agree 
on, exporting nations will suspect the border tax to be hidden protectionism.  
Further, countries like Norway, with its high export of fossil fuels, is often met with critique 
for not limiting its fossil fuel production and thereby bringing about GHG emissions 
reductions abroad. Clearly, as long as other countries have GHG taxes below the globally 
optimal, export of fossil fuels from Norway will likely be excessive.  This could be amended 
by introducing an export tax on oil consistent with the hypothetical price on GHG emissions. 
On the other hand, we will argue that doing so is in conflict with the concept of a sufficient 
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global climate treaty in which each state only are responsible for the emission from their own 
jurisdiction.  
7.2 Technology policy 
It seems impossible to reduce global carbon emissions without significant technological 
progress (within zero emission energy technologies, zero emission vehicles, etc.) in 
combination with regulatory and institutional change. Technology policy is consequently 
becoming more and more an integral part of climate policy. But do market pull policies such 
as limiting national emission or putting a price on carbon emissions give sufficient incentives 
for technological development alone? Many scientific contributions on this topic suggest not 
(Stern, 2006). Thus, technology policy should play a part in a “good” climate policy, but how 
do we measure whether this is done by a sensible approach and to the right degree?  
There are many reasons for why the current research and development (R&D) effort with 
respect to less GHG intensive technologies may be too low. Firstly, there are the market 
failures related to all technology development. Governments in most countries try to correct 
for these market failures by subsidizing R&D etc. Secondly, since the current climate treaty is 
insufficient, global demand for less GHG intensive technologies is too small. This again could 
imply that too few resources are going into R&D on such technologies. Finally, new 
emerging fields of technology development may have problems attracting researchers and 
research finance because doing research on existing technologies pay better, see for instance 
Acemoglu et al. (2010).  
Although, it seems impossible to deduce some kind of benchmark for determining a certain 
level of technology support like we have done for GHG emissions and the GHG emission 
price, an indicator could track the level of R&D going into GHG reducing technologies as 
compared to R&D spent on traditional technologies. Thus, we propose that countries should 
track and categorize their R&D effort relevant for GHG emission reductions. These effort 
should be measured in money, number of man-years and output in the form of patents, 
demonstration plants etc.  
7.3 Regulation policy indicators 
Daniel Esty and Michael Porter have built statistical data from legal, regulatory and 
environmental domains to compile a ranking and indicator of the environmental performance 
of countries (Etsy and Porter 2002, 2005). They point out that environmental performance is 
not merely a function of economic development, but also of conscious policy choices. They 
further argue against the traditional trade-off between being green or competitive, and argue 
that the evidence points towards strong environmental performance being positively 
correlated with competitiveness and economic development (op. cit. 2002, p. 86) 
Two NGO’s, “GermanWatch” and “Climnet” have contributed to a global indicator of 
Climate Change Performance Index, CCPI, published annually, see 
http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/ccpi.html. Its basis is the performance rating by climate 
change experts from non-governmental organizations in the countries that are evaluated. By 
means of a questionnaire, they give a judgment and "score" on the most important measures 
of their governments in the sectors energy, transport, residential and industry. In addition, the 
national and international efforts and impulses of climate policies are also scored. The climate 
policy is weighted to 20% of total (while the level is 30% and the trend 50%). Over 120 
selected national climate experts contributed to the evaluation of the 57 countries of the CCPI 
2009. They evaluated their own countries‘ national and international policy. The latter is also 
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rated by climate experts that observe the participation of the respective countries at the 
climate conferences.  
Thus, we would not rule out that it could be beneficial to supplement the KCPI with a KCPI-
regulation, which includes the development on a climate change performance index based on 
expert judgment. 
8 Conclusion 
Maybe the most fundamental question that this approach raises is whether Kantian ethics is 
applicable to not just to persons, but also to countries. Can – and should – we expect actions 
according to Kantian ethics from a nation state?  
The dominant approach to political science is rational choice theory. This approach can be 
represented in a number of ways, including the one we coin “state centred utilitarianism”. The 
underlying metaphor is that “each nation is like a rational utility-maximizing actor”, and thus 
the nation acts in a pure state centred welfare maximizing way as described above. However, 
this is not the only approach to understand state behaviour. The political scientist Alexander 
Wendt (1999) distinguishes international relations on the basis of three cultures of anarchies: 
Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian. In a Hobbesian culture of anarchy the dominant logic is a 
type of self-interest that will not shrink from violence to grab whatever it wants. While in a 
Lockean culture there is rivalry, it is more in the sense of competitors who will use whatever 
means to advance their interests but refrain from using violence or killing each other. Finally, 
in a Kantian international culture of anarchy, nation states will refrain from using violence to 
settle their disputes and work like a team towards a common set of ends, as for instance 
against security threats (op. cit. p. 258). In this third culture of anarchy, nations will act so 
that the maxim of their acts can be a universal law for the whole “team” to follow (op. cit., 
1999, chapt. 6). In other words, the logic of Kantian anarchy is based on shared knowledge of 
each other’s peaceful or moral intentions to follow the “Universal law”.  
The Kantian approach to choice locates morality in universal rules and duties. These would 
order the preferences differently than in a utility-maximising preference set. Some rules 
constrain economic action; others would work by reordering preferences. However, the 
Kantian approach soon runs into several challenges too (just like utilitarianism). First, not all 
moral problems can be solved by rules and individual will (van Staveren 2007, p. 26, Walsh 
2003, p.285). It excludes situations where the choice lies outside of the reach of the human 
will, such as poverty, destitution or in situations with strong social norms or bonds. Second, in 
situations where there are many conflicting rules, there is no higher-level rule that enables a 
unique ranking of moral rules according to their moral importance: “What about a situation in 
which one needs to choose between two evils, such as lying in court and betraying a friend?” 
(van Staveren, 2007, p.26). Thirdly, Kantian ethics is strictly rational and universal, and does 
not allow for a plurality of rationalities nor different cultural and religious worldviews. Some 
of these limitations are more or less solvable within the Kantian approach, but they require a 
very subtle reasoning and a deeper understanding of the sometimes very complex arguments 
of Kant himself and the huge literature of commentary on Kant that his philosophy has 
generated. 
Acting in a Kantian way with respect to climate change can also be understood from a 
“rational choice” perspective. Since it is in the long term interest of its citizens that the 
climate problem is solved, the utilitarian state should – even if it cannot accurately calculate 
the future benefits to its own citizens - work for a better treaty through international forums, 
and claim to be ready to comply with the better treaty once it materializes. Working for a 
better treaty is nearly costless. Hence, if nation states were acting from a purely utilitarian 
ethics, they could pretend to work for a better treaty while having no intention to participating 
in the treaty if it were to realize. In other words, working for a better treaty is not a credible 
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commitment to contribute to solve the global climate problem. Clearly, one way to make it 
credible, and the only truly ethical behaviour according to Kant, is to act today as if a better 
treaty were already in place. Then there can be no doubt that the nation is ready to participate 
in the better treaty. Thus, if the reason for the current lack of progress in UNFCCC climate 
treaty negotiations is lack of credibility among nations, acting in a Kantian way could 
improve matters (even if such consequentialist considerations hold little weight in a strictly 
interpreted Kantian ethics, where one should act rightly irrespective of consequences).  
Finally, there are several important criteria with which to judge the usefulness of indicators, 
among them: a) Measurability, b) Condensed information about critical developments, c) 
Relevance for policy in democratic nation states, and d) Capable of foresight by connecting 
with the precautionary principle 
Clearly, our Kantian Climate Policy Indicator (KCPI) does not fulfil all criteria. It scores high 
on a) and c), but it does not say anything about international developments, and thus scores 
low on b). Moreover, it only indirectly takes into account the precautionary principle d), 
through its incorporation of the future remaining GHG budget. We therefore believe it 
beneficial that the KCPI be accompanied by more indicators showing: 
 
• Current value of damages to the country in question caused by this year global 
emissions (like Arrow et al., 2010) 
• Predictions of global temperature increases for this century based on extrapolation of 
current emission trends 
• Predictions of global temperature increases for this century based on countries 
emission reduction plans (Copenhagen accord) 
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10 Appendix 
10.1 Current status of national climate/energy indicators 
We have examined existing indicators in most EU countries, some non-EU OECD countries, 
some developing countries, and international institutions by downloading their current 
indicator sets and definitions from their respective websites. Table 1 shows the different 
climate and energy indicators found. The table also indicates how many countries are using 
each indicator, and the level their importance (headline or other type of indicator).  
Two indicators stand out as the most common: 
• Green house gas emissions from own jurisdiction  
• Share of energy (and electricity) from renewable resources  
 
Emissions of greenhouse gases (including comparison with Kyoto goals) is by far the most 
common indicator for climate. All the examined countries have this indicator in their 
sustainable development indicators set, and all except one have it as a headline indicator.  
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Table A1 
Indicator Frequency Frequency of 
headline indicator 
Climate   
Emissions of greenhouse gases (compared to Kyoto goal) 12 11 
Emission of greenhouse gases, by sector 4  
Greenhouse gas emissions from land use, land use change and 
forestry 
1  
Emissions of CO2 2  
Emissions of CO2, by sector 1  
Emissions of CO2, from traffic 1  
Emissions of CO2 associated with electricity generation 1  
Emissions of CO2 associated with household energy 
consumption 
1  
Emissions of CO2 per inhabitant, by county 1  
Emissions of CO2 per inhabitant, nationally, OECD countries and 
developing countries.  
1  
Emissions of CO2 from private cars and car-km 1  
Emissions of CO2 from freight and tonnes-km 1  
Greenhouse gas intensity of energy consumption 1  
CO2 intensity 2 1 
CO2 intensity of private motorised modes of transport (CO2/ 
person-km) 
1  
Emissions of CO2 associated with national consumption, by 
sector  
2  
Carbon footprint (CO2) from final consumption 2  
National and global annual mean temperature  3 1 
Public expenditure on environmental protection 1  
Environmentally related taxes payed, CO2 and energy taxes 
shown separately 
4  
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Energy   
Share of renewable energy in primary energy consumption 7  
5 
Share of renewable energy in electricity consumption (or 
production) 
5 dR 1 
Gross inland energy consumption (by type of fuel) 6 D 3 
Consumption of primary energy per inhabitant 3 2 
Consumption of energy in the residential sector, (some incl. 
service sector) 
2  
Final energy consumption in the transport sector 1  
Energy production 1  
Energy intensity 5 2 
Energy intensity: Wh/GDP, by type of energy produced 1 1 
Energy intensity: Wh/GP by county 1  
Energy intensity of of means of transport (energy / person-km 
and tonnes-km) 
1  
Gross energy supply by type of energy 1  
Energy prices: electricity and fossil fuels 1  
Implicit tax rate on energy (€ / TFC) 1  
Energy (import) dependency  3  
 
 
